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I. Introduction
In recent decades the relation of Islam to politics has become the
object of numerous studies. The discussions have been wide-
ranging, with hardly any subject that has a possible bearing on
the relation between Islam and politics left untouched.
There are many plausible ways of classifying the resulting
literature. One useful way calls for distinguishing between those
studies which view Islam mainly as a subject of national (or
regional) interest, and those which view Islam as a subject of
international relations. An example of the first kind is the study
of the role which Islamic political movements play in relation to
the processes of political modernization and transition to
democracy which are taking (or failing to take) place in different
Muslim majority countries. This has become a fashionable subject,
in view of the electoral successes which many Islamic political
movements have recently enjoyed in many different places.
Another example of the same kind is the study of Islam in relation
to national identity, and to self-determination on the basis of
nationality (or ethnicity), as opposed to religion.
Obviously, questions about the conduct of internal politics and
the definition of collective identity have a particular aspect, in
the sense that the answers and the arrangements which different
peoples arrive at are for the most part their own concern. Like
Christianity, Islam is a universal religion, but it is not a universal
phenomenon. Hence its particular manifestations need not all
command universal interest or be of universal concern.
In addition to the study of Islam as a topic of specific national
interest, Islam has also been studied in connection with
international relations as a subject in its own right, regardless
of whether Islamic movements attain political power in this or
that region. This is the case in studies which focus on the attitude
and impact of different Islamic groups and movements on
human rights, war and peace, world order, interethnic relations,
relations between Islam and the West— in short, foreign and
international relations.
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These are, then, two legitimate areas of inquiry within the broader
subject of Islam and politics. Although they can be studied
separately, the two areas are not unrelated. It can hardly be
contested that from the time of the first Islamic polity, domestic
Islamic politics had, and for a long time continued to have, fateful
implications for the surrounding empires and cultures. In recent
centuries, the picture has been markedly reversed: the way
Muslims conduct their domestic politics has been greatly affected
by modern (international) developments in the spheres of ideology
as well as organization (e.g., the rise of the nation-state world
order). Either way, domestic and international politics have great
relevance to each other.
Despite their mutual relevance, the two above-mentioned areas
of inquiry have been for the most part considered separately, or
with greater emphasis falling on one side or the other. But I think
there is much to be gained from a comparative perspective which
pays equal attention to both. This is to be done not only for the
sake of finding connections or correlations which may serve to
explain changes and developments, but because patterns of change
and development themselves become more intelligible when they
are held in view simultaneously.
The aim of the present paper is to undertake such a comparative
study, to determine the implications of Islamic political thought
for present-day politics and international relations. In order to
accomplish this we have to query the Islamic past in some detail.
For, as it has been remarked frequently, contemporary Islamic
political thought is deeply rooted in its past.
For our purposes, it is convenient to think of the development of
Islamic political thought in terms of three distinct stages: Classical,
Middle, and Modern. The Classical stage, from about 632 A.D.
to 900 A.D., coincides with the rise of Islamic power which went
uncontested until it succeeded in establishing dominion over an
area stretching from the Iberian Peninsula in the west to India in
the east. This stage is characterized by clear, self-confident and
assertive views about politics and international relations. The
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Middle stage, which lasted from the tenth century till the
nineteenth, includes the periods of the Crusades, Reconquest, and
Ottoman Empire. This was a period in which Muslim power saw
much fluctuation. It is clear to us now that, during this period, the
Classical Islamic view of politics and international relations had
ceased to apply to reality, but there was no official recognition of
this fact at the time, nor were there any serious attempts at
intellectual innovation.
Of greatest interest to us is the Modern stage, which can be dated
from the early attempts at reform in the Ottoman Empire during
the first half of the nineteenth century, till the present. Although
this stage is the shortest in terms of time span, it is considerably
richer and more complex than the previous stages in terms of the
number of schools of thought, and the arguments which have been
used to support different interpretations of Islam.
One of the consequences of the richness and complexity to be
observed in the Modern period is that it is impossible to make
unqualified generalizations about “the meaning” or “the
implications” of contemporary Islamic thought for domestic
(national) politics and international relations. Nevertheless, it
will be argued in this paper that when we focus on mainstream
developments we notice a remarkable difference. With respect
to international relations, Islamic thought has progressed from
an exclusivist outlook which viewed “jihad” (commonly, and
rather loosely, translated as “holy war”) as a legitimate
procedure for dealing with other peoples and states, to a
position which recognizes parity and the possibility of peaceful
co-existence. But with respect to domestic politics, that is,
politics which takes place within each Muslim society (or
territory) considered by itself, the view is different. Although
we have recently seen Islamic writers discuss ideas of
democracy, political pluralism and equal citizenship,
mainstream Islamic thinking has yet to give up what others
will undoubtedly call its exclusivist vision of divinely
sanctioned political truth.
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We conclude our discussion with some suggestions for a possible
explanation of the difference in the development of Islamic political
thought in the two areas of domestic and international politics.
II. The Classical Islamic Theory
Most scholars of Islamic history agree that Classical Islamic views
about state and international relations were to some extent a
reflection of the manner in which the Islamic state came into being,
and the success which Muslims had in building a vast empire in a
fairly short period of time.
The details of this history are well known, and they have been
narrated many times. But we need to outline them again here, as
this is necessary for gaining an impression of the ebb and flow of
Muslim power over the centuries, which, in its turn, is a necessary
backdrop for understanding the developments which took place
in Islamic views of politics and international relations.
When the Prophet died in 632, he was both Prophet and political
leader of the Muslim political community (umma) of which he
was the founder. The Muslim community was initially little more
than a federation of tribes, which recognized a single authority
(that of the Prophet), as symbolized by the performance of
religious rites and duties, primarily among which was the payment
of the zakat (tithe).
Muslim conquests of neighboring territories began during the
lifetime of the Prophet. By 628, four year before the death of the
Prophet, the Persian administration in what is now Iraq was
crumbling. Soon after the death of the Prophet Muslim armies
moved against the two rival empires of Persia and Byzantium.
By 644, the Persian Empire was overrun entirely, and its territories
came under Muslim rule.
The Byzantine Empire, on the other hand, proved to be a more
formidable foe. Nevertheless, Muslim armies made great advances
against it, both in the east and in the west. In the east the Muslims
11
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wrested Syria from Byzantine control, and by 674, they were
attacking Constantinople. They were not successful, but they tried
again from 716-717. The last major expedition on the Eastern
Front of the Byzantine Empire was undertaken by Harun al-Rashid
in 812. In the West, Muslims had even more spectacular successes.
By 634 they had reached Alexandria, and by 718 they had occupied
most of the Iberian Peninsula.
In sum, within a little more than one century after the death of the
Prophet, Muslim armies had completely vanquished one empire,
appropriated vast territories and laid siege to the capital of the
other. How did Muslims understand this? How did they understand
themselves and what they were doing?
It is commonly agreed upon that the domestic politics and
ideology of the Islamic state were closely related to the relations
with its neighbors, and that this connection existed from the
earliest times. Between these two levels, the domestic and the
“international” (as we think of it in retrospect), there is a middle
term with roots in the former and direct implications for the other.
This term is “jihad”.
In a way, jihad may be viewed as a continuation, albeit a
continuation with significant differences, of the pre-Islamic practice
of raiding hostile tribes, a practice which has been, according to
one historian, “an important feature of the life of the nomads of
the Arabian deserts from before the time of Muhammad until the
coming of the petrol motor in the twentieth century.”1 There were,
however, at least three important differences. Firstly, jihad took
place on much larger scale in terms of number of men who were
involved, the size of the territories which were affected, and the
duration of control. Secondly, jihad took the Muslims very quickly
to lands which lie outside Arabia. Lastly, unlike pre-Islamic raiding
activities, a new religious justification was now involved.
1
 W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1986), p. 15.
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The first difference was obviously a function of the success which
the new religion was having in terms of gaining adherents. But
the other two differences were a function of the new ideology
which the new religion represented. Tribes which joined the new
Islamic community, becoming part of the “Islamic state” could
not very well make raids against each other, since they were all
believers. They were part of the new pax Islamica, as it has been
called. As the “Islamic peace” expanded within Arabia itself, the
possibility of internal raiding was closed. The only remaining
possibility was for this activity to go farther a field.2
In terms of justification, raids came to be described as jihad, or
“striving in the path of God”. This is how Islamic raids against
the pagan communities were referred to soon after the first
Muslim victory at Badr (623) against Meccan polytheists. So
were the expeditions which took the Muslims farther a field,
east and west.
The process of growth of the early Muslim polity proceeded in
accordance with pre-Islamic practice: the formation of alliances
between tribes. The early Islamic state was a federation of tribes,
a super-tribe, as one writer put it.3 During his life-time, the Prophet
was the undisputed leader of the Muslim community. After his
death his followers resorted to the pre-Islamic tribal practice of
choosing the head of the tribe: election by the heads of the most
important clans. But given the heterogeneity of the Muslim “super-
tribe”, it was unlikely that process would work for long. Already
on the occasion of the election of the first caliph, disagreements
emerged between the Meccan and the Medinan following of the
Prophet. So after an initial strife-ridden period of rule by the non-
hereditary “Rightly Guided Caliphs” (632-661) whose election
proceeded more or less in accordance with traditional tribal
2
 Ibid., p. 17.
3
 Ibid, p. 17. Cf. Bernard Lewis, “Politics and War”, in The Legacy of Islam, ed.
Joseph Schacht (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 157.
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customs,4 the Islamic state adopted a system of government which
was more similar to that of neighboring imperial governments
than traditional tribal ways: hereditary kingship, justified by
religion, but maintained by force and/or negotiated alliances.
To early Islamic theorists, Islamic politics and relations with other
nations were not governed by economic necessities, realities of
power distribution, or pre-Islamic Arabian customs. On the
contrary, they were divinely ordained in style and substance. To
the early theorists, the state existed by virtue of a divine contract
based on the Shari’a (sacred law).5 Hence politics was not
separated from religion, and political science was considered to
be part of theology.6 The need, even the necessity for a divine
government, was deduced from either one of two sources. Some
said humans needed divine guidance in government because
humans were by nature war-like and destructive and could not
govern themselves by laws of their own making.7 But more
frequently, the necessity was deduced from strict Qur’anic
injunctions, such as the verse which says: “O ye who believe!
Obey Allah, the Messenger, and those who are in authority”. (Q.
4:59).8 In either case, people needed divine guidance, which was
4
 Khalil ’Athamneh and Jamal Joudeh, al-Intiqaliyah al-Siyasiyah fi al-Watan
al-’Arabi, Pt. 2 [Political Transitions in the Arab World] (Birzeit: The Graduate
Institute of International Studies, 2001), pp. 20-22.
5
 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (New York: AMS Press,
1955), pp. 8-9.
6
 A.K.A. Lambton, “Islamic Political Thought”, The Legacy of Islam, ed. Joseph
Schacht. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), p.404.
7
 Lewis, “War and Politics”, 162. The theme of human need for divine guidance
in government has continued down to modern times and can be found the writing
of different authors. Cf. Rashid Ghannouchi, Muqarabat fi al-’Ilmaniyyah wa
al-Mujtama’ al-Madani [Approaches to secularism and civil society], (London:
al-Markaz al-Magharib lil-tarjamah, 1999), p.27.
8
 Both grounds are mentioned in al-Mawardi in Chapter One, which deals with “the
Appointment of Imam” of his well-known. Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya. See al-Mawardi,
The Ordinances of Government. (Reading: Garnet Publishers, Ltd., 1996), p. 3.
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to be found in revelation. To institute the divine law and to ensure
that it was carried out, an “Imam who commands obedience” is
needed.9 Obedience to the Imam was thus considered a religious
as well as political obligation.
How did political community come to be defined in Islamic
thinking? According to one writer, the great majority of the Arabs
in the early seventh century had no concept of the body politic
other than the tribe.10 The basis of their social solidarity was
kinship and blood-ties, real or imagined. Although the early model
of Islamic political community was at first the tribe, this had to
change quickly as religion came to replace kinship as “the ultimate
basis of corporate identity and loyalty”.11 Underlying the new
definition of political community was the idea of universal
religion: the idea, as Lewis puts it, “that there is a single truth for
all mankind, and that it is the duty of those who possess it to share
it with others…”12 According to another author the Islamic political
ideal was that of “a universal society, between the members of
which perpetual peace was assumed”.13 This was, indeed, a
religiously imagined community, in the sense explained by
Anderson. It was a “sacred community”, “historically clocked”,
and different from modern nations in its idea about who could be
included in the community.14
9
 Ghazali’s succinct argument can be re-stated thus: Religion cannot be upheld
unless man’s worldly affairs are put in order. The latter cannot be accomplished
without an Imam who commands obedience (imam muta’). Therefore, religion
cannot be upheld without an Imam who commands obedience. See Ghazali, al-
Iqtisad fi al-I’tiqad. (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub, 1983), p.148.
10
 Watt, Islamic Political Thought, p. 12.
11
 Lewis, “Politics and War”, p.158.
12
 Lewis, “Europe and Islam”, in idem Islam and the West (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993), p.5.
13
 Lambton, “Islamic Political Thought”, p. 411.
14
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. (London: Verso, 1991), p. 13. In
this Islam was not unique, having developed in an age in which “religiously ........
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Most of the ideas explained above have been elaborated in the
writings of al-Mawardi (d. 1058), who is commonly taken to present
the standard account of Islamic political thought.15 At the beginning
of Chapter One of his famous Ordinances of Government, he defines
the office of the caliphate (referred to alternatively as Imamate) in
terms of being “vicarate of prophecy”. It is something which the
Islamic umma is obligated to establish, the basis of obligation being
reason or, alternatively, revealed law.16 al-Mawardi considers the
caliphate to be an elective office, but allows that the electors could
be very few in number. Furthermore, “Investment by the nomination
of a predecessor is permissible and correct”.17
According to al-Mawardi, allegiance to the caliph is not an
unconditional duty of the subjects, but is contingent upon the latter
carrying out his duties. Of these al-Mawardi enumerates no fewer
than ten. Eight of these have to do with of internal policy
administration, such as guarding the faith against heretics and
religious dissenters, adjudicating disputes and enforcing legal
judgments, preserving internal security, collection of alms and taxes,
and the appointment of good administrators. The duties which have
to do with foreign nations and states are two. One (the fifth) is mainly
defensive, requiring the caliph to “strengthen border posts by
deterrent equipment and fighting force so that the enemies may not
gain the chance to violate what is sanctified or shed a Muslim’s or a
protected non-Muslim’s blood”. The second duty (the sixth on al-
........ imagined communities” were common. Anderson mentions Christendom and
Umma as two examples of religiously imagined communities. But if Lewis is to
be believed, hostility to the idea of national or territorial political community was
greater in the Islamic world than in Christian Europe, where “there were Kings of
the Franks, Goths, and other people, later of France, England and other lands”. In
Islam, according to Lewis, ethnic titles were “rare” and of “minor importance”,
while territorial titles are “virtually unknown”. See “War and Politics”, p. 174.
15
 Watt, Islamic Political Thought, p.101.
16
 al- Mawardi, Ordinances of Government, pp. 3-4.
17
 al- Mawardi, The Ordinances of Government, p. 9.
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Mawardi’s list) is more interventionist: “[the caliph] must fight those
who resist the supremacy of Islam after being invited to embrace it,
until they convert or sign a treaty of subjection, so that God’s claim
to have the faith superior to any other is established”.18
The caliphal duties as expressed by al-Mawardi are stated unequivocally
and with great assurance. This and other statements by other classical
Islamic writers on external relations have led modern writers to re-
state these classical Islamic doctrines with an equal degree of assurance
and lack of equivocation. Majid Khadduri, for example, summarizes
the classical Islamic view of external relations in these words:
“The basic assumption underlying Islam’s external relations
with other nations is the principle that only the community of
believers is the subject of Islamic legal and ethical system,
while all other communities are the object of that system,
although the latter communities are by no means denied certain
advantages of the Islamic system”.19
The two communities which are envisioned here have traditionally
been referred to as Dar al-Islam ( House of Islam or Pax Islamica)
and Dar al-Harb (House of War). Between these two houses there
was supposed to be open war, until, as al-Mawardi puts it, “God’s
claim to have the faith superior to any other is established”.20
18
 Ibid, p.16. Of course, al-Mawardi was not the first to write on relations with
non-Muslim nations. Shaybani (d. 804) is more frequently mentioned in
connection with what has been called “Muslim law of nations”. But, as Majid
Khadduri has observed Shaybani “rarely formulates the general principles” on
which his discussion is based. See Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations:
Shaybani’s Siyar (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 6.
19
 Majid Khadduri, “The Islamic Theory of International Relations and Its
Contemporary Relevance”, in J. Harris Proctor, ed. Islam and International
Relations (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 24-25.
20
 al-Mawardi, Ordinances of Government, 16. In addition to the House of War
and House of Islam some jurists added a third, “the House of Hudnah or Sulh”,
provided the other party paid tribute to the Islamic state on the basis of a treaty of
“surrender on terms”. Other theorists argued that this made them part of “the
House of Islam” See Khadduri, “The Islamic Theory”, p. 26.
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The explicit presupposition of the division of the world into a
House of Islam and a House of War, together with the implicit
idea that the former had an unquestionable right to impose on
other communities a choice between embracing Islam, paying
tribute, or going to war, were based on “a continued pattern of
Islamic military expansion at the expense of non-Muslim
countries”.21 Given this it is not remarkable that classical Muslim
theorists did not pay attention to what is referred to in the Western
just war tradition as jus ad bello, that is considerations that justify
the waging of war, such as self-defense, rectification of wrongs
done, or punishment of aggression.22 Instead, their focus was on
what is called jus in bello, that is considerations which have to do
with the conduct of war. The admonitions given by the first caliph,
Abu Bakr, to Muslims warriors are worth quoting:
“O people! I charge you with ten rules; learn them well!
Do not betray, or misappropriate any part of the booty;do
not practice treachery or mutilation. Do not kill a young
child, an old man, or a woman. Do not uproot or burn palms,
or down fruitful trees. Do not slaughter sheep or a cow or
a camel, except for food. You will meet people who have
set themselves apart in hermitages; leave them to
accomplish the purpose to which they have done this. You
will come upon people who will bring you dishes and
various kinds of food. If you partake of them, pronounce
God’s name over what you eat. You will meet people who
21
 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and International
Law”, in Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War
and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, ed. John Kelsay and James Tuner
Johnson. (New York: Green Wood Press, 1991), p.196.
22
 These are the three parts of the just cause which is required for waging a just
war. See James Turner Johnson, “Historical Roots and Sources on the Just War
Tradition in Western Culture”, in Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical
Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, ed. John Kelsay
and James Turner Johnson. (New York: Green Wood Press, 1991), p. 8.
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have shaved the crown of their heads, leaving a band of
their hair around it. Strike them with the sword. Go in God’s
name, andy God protect from sword and pestilence”.23
Lewis finds some irony in the fact that while Abu Bakr could
order his commanders to leave in peace monks who secluded
themselves in hermitages, he apparently had no sympathy for those
“who have shaved the crown of their heads leaving a band of hair
around it”. Ironical or not, this should instill some caution against
reading modern ideas and sentiments into old texts and ancient
practices.
This is not the only point where Classical Islamic ideas about
politics and international relations reveal their pre-modernity.
There are some other important features which can be used to
sum up the Classical Islamic views. These should be kept in mind
as we proceed to dwell on subsequent intellectual developments.
With respect to internal (domestic politics) two features are of
great importance. The first is the definition of political community
on the basis of religion. Since Islam understood itself to be a
universal religion, the community is theoretically co-extensive
with the human race. Here some will no doubt say that Islam’s
belief in the unity of the human race, its insistence on the ultimate
insignificance of race and language and ethnicity stand in marked
contrast with the “philosophical poverty” and “irremediable
particularity” of nationalism and ethnicity.24 The second feature
is the lack of any genuine interest in the establishment of
institutions and procedures that can serve to limit despotism and
autocracy. al-Mawardi’s theory allows the caliph to designate a
successor; the caliph can also designate the electors.25 While most
Islamic political theorists agreed that a ruler who contravened
Islamic law had no right to rule, and could be disobeyed, hardly
23
 Quoted in Lewis, “War and Peace”, pp. 75-76.
24
 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 5.
25
 al-Mawardi, Ordinances of Government, pp. 9-13.
19
Raja Bahlul
any one of them presented criteria for knowing when the ruler is
no longer legitimate, nor did they present a theory of institutions
that could be relied on to decide on these matters.
With respect to the Islamic view of international relations, the
most conspicuous fact (to the modern eye) is that Islamic political
thought refuses to think of other nations and religions as equal.
The ideas of parity and reciprocity were not thinkable in terms of
the then available categories. To al-Mawardi (and, for a long time,
to others, before and after him) it seemed axiomatic that Islam is
the true religion, and that it is legitimate to wage war on others
because of the falsity of their religious doctrines.
In these respects, the Classical Islamic view of international
relations was hardly remarkable, given the historical setting in
which ideas about war and peace were formulated. It was normal,
at the time, for people who took religion seriously to think in
absolute and exclusive terms. Moreover, as the Sudanese author
Abdullahi an-Na’im reminds us, force was the basic method used
in international relations when the Islamic state was first
established.26 (According to “realist” theories of international
relations, the situation has not changed basically since then, despite
appearances to the contrary).
III. Transition to Modern Times
The nine centuries or so which elapsed between the formulation
of al-Mawardi’s theory and the nineteenth century which witnessed
the first appearance of “modern” Islamic ideas about politics and
international relations were very eventful. This eventfulness did
not manifest itself so much in terms of ideas and intellectual
innovations, as in historical developments which proved the
26
 Abdullahi Ahmad An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties,
Human Rights, and International Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1990), p. 142.
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inadequacy of the Classical theory. In their turn, these historical
developments paved the way for the appearance of modern Islamic
political thought.
That al-Mawardi’s theory was not true to the facts of his time
was evident from the start. In the words of Albert Hourani, “Even
as [al-Mawardi’s] doctrine of authority was being stated the
movement of history was making it inadequate”.27 Already from
the ninth century onward, Turkish mercenary soldiers, first
imported during the caliphate of al-Wathiq, had begun to exercise
real power, appointing and dismissing caliphs, and generally
determining government policy. Independent dynasties arose in
different provinces—they ruled in the name of caliph,
acknowledging his religious authority, but he had no power over
them. Eventually, the Abbasid caliph ceased to have power in
his own capital, Baghdad. During the reign of al-Mustakfi (944-
946), a generation or so before al-Mawardi was born, the Shi’ite
general Ahmad ibn Buwayh arrived in Baghdad, which was
supposed to be the capital of Sunnite orthodoxy, and was made
commander-in-chief (amir al-¨umara’) by the caliph.
Not only did Muslim dominion suffer form internal division and
feuding, but towards the end the eleventh century the Crusaders
descended on lands which were conquered by the Muslim only
few centuries before, and were not completely Islamized yet.
Ghazali (d. 1111), a great theologian but also a political theorist,
died only sixteen years after the First Crusade (1095). His political
ideas reflect the troubled times during which he lived. They also
show the extent to which the jurists were willing to make
concessions when it came to the qualifications and method of
electing the caliph. With regard to the method by which the caliph
may come to occupy this position, Ghazali mentions three: a caliph
could be designated by the Prophet, he could be designated by
27
 Albert Hourani, Arab Thought in the Liberal Age (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1962), p. 10.
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the previous caliph, or finally (and more interestingly) he could
be nominated by a “possessor of power” (rajul dhi shawkah).28
Although it is desirable, the caliph (or Imam) need not have
excellent knowledge of the Shari’a, provided he is willing to
consult with the jurists. Ghazali is willing to make a concession
not only with respect to the imam’s knowledge, but also his justice.
His plea is that these concessions are not voluntary:
 “The concessions which we hereby make are not
voluntary, but necessity may render lawful even that
which is forbidden. We know that it is forbidden to eat
carrion, but it would be worse to die of hunger. If anyone
does not consent to this, and holds the opinion that the
imamate is dead in our time, because the necessary
qualifications are lacking, and he persists in this opinion
but is not able to replace the imamate, not having at hand
anyone who possesses these necessary qualifications,
then we would ask him ‘Which is the better part, to
declare than the qadis are revoked, that all authorizations
are invalid, that marriages cannot be legally contracted,
that all acts of government everywhere are null and void,
and thus to allow that the entire population is living in
sin ≠ or is it better that the imamate exists in fact, and
therefore that the transactions and administrative actions
are valid, given the actual circumstances and necessities
of these times?” 29
With Ghazali’s “concessions” about the qualifications of the caliph
and the manner in which he may come to occupy his position,
one can say that classical framework of ideas about the constitution
and the inner workings of the Islamic state has been more or less
completely abandoned.
28
 Ghazali, al-Iqtisad fi al-I’tiqad, p. 150.
29
 Ibid., p. 151.This passage is translated in Lewis, Political Language of Islam,
pp. 101-102.
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Just as developments within “the House of Islam” eventually made
the classical political theory invalid, so relations with “the House
of War” were eventually destined to make the classical ideas about
jihad equally untenable. But this did not happen quickly. In fact,
it was not until 1535, when the Ottoman Sultan, Sulayman the
Magnificent, signed a treaty with the King of France, that
indications of a serious change of attitude could be seen.
Of course, this was not the first time that a Muslim ruler reached
an understanding with kings and lords of “the House of War”.
Treaties between Muslims and unbelievers go along way back. In
fact, they go back to the lifetime of the Prophet himself, who
made truce with the Meccan unbelievers in 628. The treaty, known
as “Sulh of al-Hudaybiya”, was contracted at a time when both
parties were in need of a breathing space, and was supposed to
last for ten years only, during which people on both sides were to
be “secured and guaranteed [from attack] by each other”.30
Subsequently, many treaties were contracted by Muslim rulers
under a variety of circumstances, and for different reasons. During
the Umayyad period, both Mu‘awiyah and ‘Abd al-Malik
concluded treaties with the Byzantines, so they could free
themselves to fight rivals and insurgents. Remarkably, they had
to pay tribute, something which led to disagreement among
Muslim jurists.31 In 802 Empress Irene had to pay tribute to the
Abbasid Caliph Harun al-Rashid; in 1192, during the period of
the Crusades, Saladin reached an understanding with Richard
Lionheart to facilitate pilgrimage;32 and in 1229 Sultan al-Kamil
of Egypt concluded a treaty whereby the (Crusader) Kingdom of
Jerusalem was ceded the area of Bethlehem along with a corridor
running to the sea.33
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Khadduri notes that the text of these treaties was invariably brief
and general, with the preamble containing names of representatives
and their titles.34 The treaties themselves were supposed to have a
limited duration, a maximum of ten years, following the precedent
set by the Sulh al-Hudaybiya. More importantly, they did not imply
de juri but only de facto, recognition. That is, the ethical-legal
codes subscribed to by the one party could not accord legitimacy
to the other. There was only one type of recognition ≠ the
recognition of mere “facts of nature”, which were to a great extent
outside the moral order of things. This applies even to “the Peace
of Amasya”, which Sulayman the Magnificent concluded with
the Shah of Iran in 1555. It was simply an exchange of letters in
which each of the two leaders sets the terms to which he agreed.35
The 1535 treaty between Sulayman the Magnificent and the King
of France was very different. It was different in that it implied,
for the first time, an official recognition of Christianity by the
most important Muslim ruler of his time. According to Khadduri,
the treaty involved three major innovations: the treaty provided
for a “valid and sure” peace between the Sultan and the King of
France “during their lives”, as opposed to the 10-year period which
was customary in Islamic law; the parties were to treat each other
“on the basis of equality and mutuality of interest”, and finally,
French subjects (merchants, travelers, etc.) were to be exempted
from payment of the poll-tax allowed to live in accordance with
their own laws and jurisdiction, not being subject to the Shari’a
in their dealings with Muslims.36
As the Ottoman Empire grew weaker, it was forced to enter into
less and less favorable treaties with Western powers. In particular,
during the time between the second siege of Vienna in 1683 and
the beginning of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire fought
34
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many wars which led to loss of much European territory, and to
the emergence of what came to be called the “Eastern Question”.
In 1699, the Ottomans were forced to sign the Treaty of Carlowitz
as a defeated power. The treaty of 1535 was revised in 1740 to
give France the right to protect the Sultan’s Christian subjects,
regardless of their “Ottoman” nationality. Similar rights were given
to the Russians in the Treaty of Kuchuk Qaynaria of 1774.37 In
many cases the Ottomans had to enlist the help of friendly Western
powers in order to get a better deal for themselves, and in this
way they were “forgetting the strategy of Holy War; they were
learning the politics of survival and the new art of diplomacy”.38
The significance of such treaties to Islamic political thought is
not readily apparent. Some, in fact, may say that they have no
significance at all, since Muslim theorists have habitually refused
to lend juristic recognition to precedents set by caliphs and sultan
whom they regarded as being less than “exemplary”. Such,
undoubtedly, would be the judgment over treaties which flaunted
the 10-year limit of truce with Dar al-Harb, or which agreed to
limiting the operation of Shari’a in “Dar al-Islam”.
But to say this is to underestimate the indirect effect which political
practice eventually comes to exercise on political theory. For
despite the rift which developed early on between an “idealistic”
Islamic theory of politics and international relations on the one
hand, and the practices of Islamic states themselves on the other,
theory could not indefinitely remain oblivious to political realities.
Ghazali’s “theoretical” concessions were not made in isolation
from the political realities of his time. The same is true of modern
period: it is doubtful if we can understand the relative ease with
contemporary Islamic political thought has come to recognize
“parity” between equally sovereign states in abstraction from the
practices of Islamic states in recent times. Political theory, in the
37
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end, is forced to come to terms with what exists in reality. Shireen
Hunter is probably right to think that
“The only constructive way to develop a view of an Islamic
theory of international relations ... is through the study of
the history of Islamic states’ relations with other Muslim
and non-Muslim states, as well as their application of
certain basic … Islamic concepts bearing on international
relations, especially regarding the interpretation of these
principles to fit the external realities of the times and the
internal needs of the states”.39
Repeated encounters with the West, defeats which Muslim states
were subjected to, and the unequal treaties which they had to sign,
all these factors in the long run had the effect of making it
practically necessary (even if not theologically desirable) to think
of the “other” in terms of equality or reciprocity.
To these factors which affected the development of Islamic ideas
about international relations must be added the different
processes of Western-based reform during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. These reforms not only implied the
humbling recognition of the need to learn from the “other”, but
they also had the effect of facilitating further changes in political
thought and attitude which were to come to fruition only in the
twentieth century.
From the late eighteenth century onward, the Ottomans began to
make efforts to modernize the army. European technicians were
brought in, and factories were built to manufacture modern
weapons and ammunitions. But the most important efforts at
reform were the famous Tanzimat Reforms, from 1839 to 1876.
In the field of education, the reforms meant the introduction of
specialized Western-type training in medicine, naval engineering,
39
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diplomacy, translation, and civil service. More generally, the
Ottomans sought to emulate the non-Muslim schools founded by
foreign missionaries, which used a modern curriculum. Laws were
also reformed to be more in line with European laws: thus
commercial, maritime and penal codes were introduced in the
second half of the nineteenth century. There were also
administrative reforms which affected government organization,
and the economy.40
Symbolic of the spirit of the “modern world” into which the
Muslims were being ushered under the leadership Ottoman Empire
is the new language of the Imperial proclamation known as Hatti-
i Humayan of 1856. In this proclamation the Sultan declares his
aim to be the happiness of all his subjects, and that no inequality
on the basis of religion, language or race in regard to holding
government posts would be allowed.41 This was indeed a new
language, never heard before, as far as the Muslim lexicon is
concerned. It was spoken under European pressure, but it was
also in part born out of a desire on the part of the Ottomans to
make themselves acceptable in the modern European world which
was becoming their world also.
Hatti-i Humayan was not implemented; it is not likely that it was
promulgated on the basis of genuine conviction. But it does not
matter if the new political language which the educated and ruling
classes were becoming acquainted with did not carry much
conviction for them, or did not have mass appeal at the time. Many
modern European ideas about politics and international relations
were destined to strike root among twentieth century Muslims in
such a way so as to make Classical Islamic political thought a
thing of the past. This process was aided by historical
developments (colonization, integration into world economy)
which the Muslims were powerless to prevent.
40
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IV. The Modern Period
The entry of Muslim nations into the modern period meant
integration into a world that was characterized by two salient facts.
Both were to have important consequences for the content of
Islamic political thought. Firstly, Muslim power has been greatly
diminished. Two important Muslim dynasties, the Safavids in
Persia and the Mughals in Central Asia, were in collapse, while
the greatest dynasty of all, the Ottomans, was slowly losing many
of its possessions to Western powers. This process reached its
final conclusion in the final dismemberment of the Ottoman
Empire shortly after the end of World War I. Muslim thinkers
who witnessed this process gradually unveil before their eyes in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not in a position
to assert a distinctive Islamic “truth” against European ideas and
practices. If anything, they were forced to occupy the position of
the pupil who had to absorb lessons, who had to learn the ways of
the modern world. A feeling of respect for the West began to
develop gradually, which in the fullness of time was translated
into a readiness to think of the West in terms of parity and
reciprocity. From the point of view of Classical Islamic thought,
this was a great concession.
Secondly, the modern world into which Muslim nations were
ushered was rapidly becoming a world of nation-states. This is a
mode of being which Muslim populations did not and could not
experience under Ottoman rule. But when the Ottoman Empire
was dismembered, many peoples and territories were forced to
take this path. They were “mandated into nationhood”, as one
historian put it, referring to the political development which
Western mandatory powers initiated in former Ottoman
territories.42 This development was bound to have far-reaching
42
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consequences for Islamic political thought, long used to the idea
of the “universal community of believers” which transcends all
distinctions of language and race, and which does not recognize
geographical boundaries. Now Islamic political thought had to
come to terms with “the national community”, in many ways the
very antithesis of the universal community.
Many Islamic political movements, schools of thought, and
intellectual orientations flourished during the last two centuries
or less, since Western influence over Muslim life began to gather
momentum. But lest we lose sight of the “forest” on account of
the many trees to be found here, two “macro” traits of modern
Islamic political thought, associated with main-stream
developments, should be noted.
Firstly, modern mainstream Islamic political thought still
envisions the establishment of an Islamic state. Nothing that has
taken place in the intervening centuries since the Classical period
has succeeded in convincing the great figures of the modern period
of the need or the desirability of making a clean separation
between the spheres of religion and politics. Thus opposition to
secularism in all its forms (liberalism, nationalism, socialism,
humanism) is a theme which runs through many otherwise
moderate Islamic writings.
Nevertheless, mainstream Islamic political thought knows that
the only realizable type of Islamic state for the time being is a
“nation-state” type of Islamic state. In other words, it know that,
to succeed at all, it must succeed in a world of nation-states. For
this reason attempts are made to come to terms with nationalism,
without forsaking altogether the idea of a single Islamic umma
with no ethnic or linguistic boundaries.
Secondly, mainstream Islamic political thought has dropped the
traditional “House of Islam vs. House of War” terminology, and
with it, the idea of waging jihad on non-Muslims for the sake of
propagating the Faith. Having reached maturity in a world of
diminished Muslim power, and superior Western force, it is content
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to call for equality and reciprocity when it comes to dealing with
other nations and religions. As far as goal of the universal
community is concerned, it has been part of the process of adaptation
of Islamic thought to external reality to postpone the goal so far
into the future, so that, as one writer puts its, “it becomes
transformed from a historical goal, achievable within historic time,
into a messianic goal to achieved at some distant and unknown
time”.43 Consequently, the notion of jihad is gradually re-interpreted
to mean self-defense against aggressors, the peaceful propagation
of the Faith, or some other equally inoffensive proposal.
We shall return to these two traits of the mainstream in order to
explain the apparent lack of parallelism between them with regard
to the question of the relation between religion and politics. But
for now we need to take an overview of the range and variety of
schools of thought which have found followers among Islamic
thinkers, political activists, people, and political movements.
Here we are initially faced with a bewildering variety of terms
that have been used to describe different Islamic ideologies. A
partial list of adjectives includes: Fundamentalist, Extremist,
Terrorist, Radical, Traditionalist, Revivalist, Moderate, Militant,
Modernist, Reformist, Liberal, Conservative, and Leftist. Most
of these names capture something of the essence of this
movement or that, but a classification system is needed to put
order into this bewildering variety.
For the sake of completeness, we shall consider not only those
Islamic ideologies which have succeeded in establishing political
movements or parties, but also those which have been restricted to
the realm of intellectual discussion, or which may even be opposed
to the idea of political organization on the basis of religion. ( These,
too, may are not altogether irrelevant to what transpires in reality).
Having said this, we shall use two classifications which (together)
succeed in capturing most, if not all of the intellectual and political
43
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movement that have had an impact on Islamic scene. The two
classifications to be presented here are not unrelated, but exact
correspondence is not to be expected in all cases.
The first classification considers Islamic ideologies and
movements in terms of the methods of action which they encourage
or allow. From this perspective we can distinguish between three
groups: Militant, Popular, and Official. Militant Islamism allows
the use of violent methods of action, which their opponents,
specially in the West, will not hesitate to describe as “terrorist”.
They have a “revolutionary” aspect, and they may encourage
infiltration of the armed forces in the hope of reaching power by
mean of an army rebellion. Typically, such groups are not overly
concerned with grass-roots activism. The “masses”, which are
kept at a distance, are expected to rise up suddenly after
cataclysmic events helped on by the militants.
Popular Islamism, on the other hand, is in many ways the opposite
of this. Theirs is a grass-roots type of activism. Typically, they form
political parties, create civil society organizations, and they seek to
Islamize society in a gradual and peaceful sort of way. For this reason
they have been often willing to participate in elections, even when
elections take place under constitutions and systems of governments
which are (from an Islamic viewpoint) essentially flawed.
What we may call “Official Islamism” is a not a commonly recognized
type of Islamic activism, but it deserves separate recognition on
account of its distinct mode of operation, and the impact which it has
had nationally and internationally. What we intend to refer to here is
“the religious establishments” in different Muslim countries which
receive financial support form the governments, by means of which
they are able to support charities, mosques, and schools which spread
a certain type of conservative Islamic doctrine.44 Members of the
44
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religious establishment generally support policies and programs of
change under government guidance. Like governments in most
Muslim countries, this type of Islamic activism is hostile to Militant
Islamism, and deeply suspicious of the democratic implications of
Popular Islamism.
The second classification of Islamic ideologies (and movements)
is the more familiar classification in terms of the general character
of the ideas and concepts which they employ. Under this heading
it is possible to distinguish at least three distinct orientations:
Fundamentalist, Centrist, and Liberal. All have implications in
the areas of domestic and international politics.
Of all these orientations, Fundamentalist Islamism is in some ways
the simplest and easiest to deal with. The Fundamentalist view of
domestic and international politics is governed by a conception
of Islam, which (to external observers) is “static” and “immutable”.
Fundamentalists do not see religion as being shaped by social
reality and development; on the contrary, they think religion should
shape social development and reality.45 Their attitude towards
modernity is deeply hostile. Speaking of the Qutbians, Takfirists,
and Jihadists, one writer says that they neither want to modernize
Islam, nor do they want to Islamize modernity; rather, they are
simply “anti-modernity”.46
In their vision of the Islamic state, Fundamentalists do not depart
very widely from the ideal that was laid during the Classical
period, except (perhaps) in so far as they explicitly deny certain
45
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modern notions which they regard as un-Islamic, such as the idea
of popular sovereignty, or the idea that people (or their
representatives) have a right to legislate laws. Sayyid Qubt’s
words in this regard have been taken to heart by most
contemporary Fundamentalists:
“The right of ruler-ship gives rise to the right to legislate to
people, the right to prescribe a way for people to live, a right
to institute the values which this life is to be based on. ...
Whoever claims for himself the right to legislate a way of life
for a people thereby claims divine authority over them, for he
seeks to appropriate the most important attribute of divinity.
Whoever amongst the people accepts this claim has thereby
agreed to make this person a God in place of the true God, for
he attributes to him the most important attributes of divinity”.47
Thus Article 72 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, whose formulation is supposed to have been influenced by
Imam Khomeini,48 states that “The Islamic Consultative Assembly
cannot enact laws contrary to the usul [fundamental principles]
and ahkam [rules] of the official religion of the country”;49 even a
moderate Islamic thinker such al-Turabi says quite clearly that
“there is no place in Islam for a popular government which is
separated from the Faith”, that democracy in Islam means “popular
power in accordance with shari’a [divine law]”.50 It is this
47
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insistence on the central role of divine law, which is supposed to
have equal power over the ruler and the ruled, that has led some
authors to speak of the form of Islamic state as a type of
“nomocracy”. 51
With respect to nationalism and belief in the transnational Islamic
umma, it is possible to obtain an impression of tension between
the two in the aforementioned Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Thus whereas Article 9 emphatically states that “No
individual, group or authority, has the right to infringe in the
slightest way upon the political, cultural, economic, and military
independence the territorial integrity of Iran”, Article 11,
nevertheless insists that “…all Muslims form a single nation, …
and [the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran ] must
constantly strive to bring about the political, economic, and cultural
unity of the Islamic world”.52 What is not clear is how the pan-
Islamic goal can be achieved without infringing on the national
integrity of the modern Muslim nation-state, something which is
protected by International Law. The latter does not view relations
between “sister” Muslim states (for example, Iran and Iraq which
fought against each other from 1982 to 1988) as internal relations
within one and the same “umma” (nation). There is a lesson in
realism here which Fundamentalist Islamism is having to learn.
Of all Islamic schools of thought, Fundamentalist Islamism is the
only one which continues to give credence to the Classical
conception of jihad as something which involves active (violent,
if need be) propagation of the Islamic faith. Here reference can
be made to the preamble of the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran which speaks of striving to “prepare the way for
the formation of a single world community”, a task which the
Army will presumably help with, since it is entrusted with the
51
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task of “Jihad in God’s way; that is, extending the sovereignty of
God’s law throughout the world”.53 Particularly forceful in this
regard is Imam Khomeini’s speech on July 20, 1998 on the
occasion of accepting cease-fire with Iran, in which he said
“Our war is one of ideology and does not recognize borders
or geography. We must ensure the vast mobilization of the
soldiers of Islam around the world in our ideological war.
…We say that as long as there is infidelity and polytheism,
there will be struggle, and as long as there is struggle, we
will be there”.54
Reference may also be made to the view of Sadat’s assassins who
belonged to the Fundamentalist group al-Jihad. In a pamphlet
called “Al-Farida al-gha’ibah” (“The neglected duty”) they reject
attempts to re-interpret jihad as self-defense, and assert that “Islam
had been spread by the sword and that Muslims were duty bound
to take the military initiative against unbelievers”.55
The military echoes to be heard in Khomeini’s voice, as well as
that of Sadat’s assassins argue for identifying Islamic
Fundamentalism (in our second classification) with Militant
Islamism (in our first classification). I think the identification is
plausible, subject to some caveats. For example, it possible to
argue that the Fundamentalists are not all of the same type, that
transition in and out of violence may depend on contingent
circumstances, such as location vis-à-vis governments. The
Wahhabi religious movement which underpins the regime in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is no less deeply “conservative”, “rigid”
and “literal” in its interpretation of the Faith than the Khomeini
movement. But it differs in its interests, its alliances, as well as its
53
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“fundamentalist” interpretation of the Faith (Sunnite vs. Shi’ite).
In its method of action it has not been revolutionary, preferring to
spread its conservative version of Islam by use of oil money.
Nevertheless, the same Saudi fundamentalist milieu gave rise to
’Usama bin Laden and his followers, as well as occasional armed
confrontations within the Kingdom. Obviously, Fundamentalist
Islamism can assume different forms. Sometimes the difference
between those who are “revolutionary” and those who are
“conservative” is, as one writer puts its, “one of tone, mood,
decibel, need to act, and act now”.56
In terms of numbers, it is safe to say that Fundamentalist Islamism
does not have a large following. The same is true of Liberal
Islamism, to which we now turn (leaving mainstream, or “Centrist
Islamism”, to the last). In almost every other aspect, Liberal
Islamism is the exact opposite of Fundamentalist Islamism. Liberal
Islamists tend to be academics, “men of learning”, or civil society
activists. In keeping with their liberalism and “enlightenment”,
their mode of action shuns violence and encourages dialogue and
toleration. They are not “party builders” either, which means that
their impact on society (if they have one) is most likely to be of
the indirect sort, and not immediately visible.
Like the Modernists and the Reformists, with whom they have
much in common, Liberal Islamists tend to “perceive” Islam as a
dynamic religion, and they emphasize its “openness” and
“permissiveness” …which allow them to consider the factors of
time and societal change in their interpretation”.57 As many writers
have remarked, Liberalism comes in a variety of forms.
Accordingly, some Liberal Islamic thinkers have argued that
liberal injunctions can be explicitly found in Divine Law, while
others have argued that Divine Law is “silent” on political and
many other affairs of this world; still others have argued that
56
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religion (like any other form of human knowledge), must be
interpreted within human needs and limitation.58
With respect to their vision of domestic politics, the most noticeable
thing about the liberals is that they are willing to live with
nationalism. Their political realism leads them to believe that the
Islamic umma in an untenable notion. More remarkably, some have
been known to throw the door wide open for secularism. This
applies particularly to Ali ’Abd al-Raziq who wrote in 1925 saying
that “The Prophet Muhammad … brought a pure spiritual message,
with no admixture of political authority or call for establishing a
state”.59 In this respect ’Abd al-Raziq has found a worthy heir in
Justice Sa’id al-Ashmawi who believes that “the form of
government in Islam is that which follows the spirit of religion.
… [it] flows from the will of the people and rules in the name of
the people for the people”.60 According to al-’Ashmawi, the
government in Egypt is Islamic, because it does not prevent people
from performing their religious duties, and works for justice.
“Every government looking for justice is an Islamic government”.61
Because of their willingness to accommodate nationalism and
secularism, the Liberal Islamists’ view of domestic politics may be
considered to be “modern”. Modernism is also the hallmark of their
view of international relations. Some are explicit in their criticism
of the shortcomings of Shari’a’s in this area. According to Abdullahi
an-Na’im, Shari’a is “in direct conflict with the Charter of the United
Nations”; furthermore, “Shari’a’s underlying theme of a permanent
58
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state of war with, and non-recognition of non-Muslim states
repudiates the entire basis of modern international law”.62 In
common with his teacher Mahmoud Taha, who held similar views
for which he was put to death during the rule of the Sudanese
General Ja’far al-Numeiry in 1984, an-Na’im in effect argues that
large sections of the Qur’an are no longer valid. He advocates
reform in the Shari’a so as to bring in line with modern international
law. The only way to achieve the desired reform is to
“substitute as bases of Islamic law those clear and definite
verses of the Qur’an and related Sunna that sanction the
use of force and in propagating Islam among non-Muslims
and in upholding it among renegade Muslims with texts of
the Qur’an and Sunna that enjoin the use of peaceful means
in achieving those objectives”.63
Liberal Islamists do not hesitate to re-interpret the notion of jihad so
as to accord with modern notions about non-aggression. To some like
Ashmawi, jihad is not holy war; what it mean, rather, is “to control
yourself, to refine yourself… and as you fight, it is only for self-
defense”.64 Others have sought to view jihad in terms of liberation and
humanism. Such is the view of Ayatollah Murtza Mutahhari, who wrote
in the 1960s saying that “the holiest form of war is that which is fought
in defense of humanity and of humanity’s rights”. To Mutahhari, the
Europeans who fought along with the Algerians for the sake of the
liberation of the latter, engaged in jihad; not only that, but their jihad
was holier than the jihad of the Algerians, because it was on behalf of
the universal rights of humanity.65 This is a far cry from the classical
notion of jihad as something which only Muslims could engage in.
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We remarked earlier that, in common with the Fundamentalists,
the Liberals do not have a large following.66 In this respect, both
groups stand in marked contrast with what have chosen to refer to
as “Centrist” or mainstream Islamism, to which we now turn.
Initially, it should be noted that some writers do not see the
“Centrists” the same way we do here. Raymond William Baker,
for example, places the “Islamic center” between two forces:
“discredited secular rulers, who preside over failed nationalist
development projects”, and “the foundationalist Islamic militants”.67
We agree with Baker in placing the foundationalists and the militants
(the Fundamentalists and the Militants in the classifications which
we have been using), to the “right” of the Centrists, but to the left
we place the “Liberals” who are indeed sometime associated with
“secular rule” (think of Justice Ashmawi who believes that the
Egyptian government possesses Islamic credentials).
According to the same writer, the Centrists are hard to define. They
have family resemblances, “a set of characteristics that, when found
in some substantial combination, give a moderate appearance or
character to the group”. The most important qualities which Baker
lists are worth mentioning. They include: belief in gradual change
through dialogue (as opposed to the use of violence); tolerance for
diversity; transnational outlook; the practice of social action; support
of civil society against the authoritarian state; and openness to global
dialogue.68 Understandably, the difference between the Liberals and
66
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believers. Davis’ description of Ashmawi’s life-style in her book Between Jihad
and Salaam will certainly raise eye-brows among ordinary believers: Ashmawi
is not married, he does not fast (for health reasons), and he keeps statues of
Greek gods and goddesses in various part of his house.
67
 Raymond William Baker, “Invidious Comparisons: Realism, Postmodern
Globalism, and Centrist Islamic Movements in Egypt,” in Political Islam:
Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform, ed. John L. Esposito. (London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1997), p.116.
68
 Ibid., p. 122.
39
Raja Bahlul
the Centrist (who may all be called “modernists”, reformists”, and
—from a certain point of view— “moderates”) is often a difference
of degree. For example, no single “Centrist” author named by Baker
will follow Ashmawi’s almost explicit support of secularism, or
an-Na’im’s abolitionist view of the Qur’an. But they all would
accept most of the above-mentioned criteria of “centrism”.
Of all the Islamic movements that claim to occupy a middle
position between different contending interpretations of Islam,
the Society of the Muslim Brothers, which was founded in Egypt
in 1928, is probably the most well-known and most influential. It
has nurtured or otherwise influenced the intellectual development
of many leading contemporary Islamists, such as Hasan Turabi
of Sudan (Nationalist Islamic Front), and Rachid Ghannouchi of
Tunisia (Islamic Tendency Movement), and Mahfoud Nahnah of
Algeria (HAMAS). But, of course the “centrist” position has not
been restricted to the Muslim Brothers movement. Many
individuals in and out of politics are arguably “centrists”.
Prominent figures include Muhammad Khatami (President of the
Islamic Republic of Iran), Khurshaid Ahmad (Pakistan Islamic
Front) and the well-known scholar Yusuf al-Qardawi.
Unlike, the Fundamentalists, the Centrists have come to terms
with the modern nation-state, and are able to function within the
framework which this latter provides (limited territory and popular
sovereignty). But unlike the Liberal Islamists, the Centrists do
not seem to be willing to give up on the project of establishing an
Islamic state, ruled by Shari’a (suitably interpreted and reformed).
The Centrists are typically social activists who hope to Islamize
society “from below”. Hence they are active in areas of social
welfare, health, and education, often meeting needs which are
not adequately met by corrupt secular regimes.
Centrist Islamists have also typically been willing to participate in
elections, even when secular governments, afraid of Islamic victories
at the ballot box, banned Islamic parties. This is what the Egyptian
Muslim Brothers did in Egypt in 1984, when they participated in
elections under the banner of the secular New Wafd Party, and again
The Development of Islamic Views on Politics and International Relations
40
in 1987, when they allied themselves with the Socialist Party.69 But
the willingness displayed by some Islamists to accept the rules of
the political game as laid down by secular nationalist governments
has sometimes carried them close to conservatism. This applies
particularly to the Muslim Brothers of Jordan, who, for a long time,
made common cause with the Jordanian regime in fighting
Nasserists, socialists, and other political movement on the Left.
Though they may have wanted an “Islamic Jordan”, they wanted to
go about this task slowly and peacefully, so as not to upset basic
social and economic structures. “People have a right to expect
Islamization,” says one of their representatives, but “the government
has a right to be choosy, to be selective in these steps, and to move
when things are ripe and correct and necessary”.70
There is no blue print of Islamic government which the followers
of the “Islamic center” would be prepared to institute if they were
to be given full mandate by the people, something which they
have yet to obtain. It is tempting to say that the Iranian experiment
in Islamic rule, with its Guardian Council which keeps watch on
legislation lest it breach Islamic rules, provides a suitable model
for mainstream Islamists. It is tempting to make an inference to
this effect on the basis of reservations which prominent thinkers
such as Ghannouchi and Turabi express with respect to the power
of the legislature. Ghannouchi, for example has expressed the
view that the power which the people (and their representatives)
have is limited by the divine law which is to be found in the Qur’an
and the Traditions of the Prophet.71 Similarly, Turbi has expressed
the view that “there is no place in Islam for a popular government
which is separated from the Faith”, and that the divine law is like
69
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a “detailed constitution”.72 In other respects, the Islamic Centrists
are not constrained to follow the model of government to be found
in Classical Islamic theory. As the Iranian experience has shown,
it is possible to adopt Western modes of organization and
administration while keeping to the spirit of the Faith.
With respect to their position on international relations, relations
between Islam and the West, and intercultural dialogue in general, the
Centrists hold moderate, middle-of-the-road views which distinguish
them from both Fundamentalists and Liberals. Like Liberals, but unlike
Fundamentalists, they tend to re-interpret jihad so that it does not
imply propagation of the Faith by force. Says Turabi in an interview:
“…the Qur’an itself prohibits forcing anyone to become a
Muslim. So you don’t spread [Islam] through military
[force]. You defend yourself, of course, through argument
or through military. It depends on how the aggression is If
it is an aggression by words, you just reply. It it’s an
aggression by military, you can also defend yourself in a
military manner. But the religion has to be spread freely”.73
Cooperation with other nations and cultures on the basis of mutual
respect and the exchange of interests is welcome. According to
Ghannouchi, “The Message of Islam is not to uproot or ban any
achievement from any civilization, from wherever it comes, but
to protect, to preserve it and to build on it”.74 Some authors seek
foundations for peaceful international relations in the Qur’an itself.
Thus Qardawi says “The true message of Islam is peace. Islam
invites all nations to come together as the Qur’an says: ‘We have
made you people and tribes to know each other”.75 (Q.49:13)
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The Fundamentalists are not likely to be found interpreting jihad
in these terms. Instead they prefer focus on Qur’anic verses which
seem to imply conflict and the use of force. (A case in point is the
verse which says “Prepare against them whatever force you are
able to muster, …striking fear into the enemy of God and your
enemy and others beside them” (Q. 8:60), which is featured in
the preamble to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran).
Still, the Centrists are able to differ from the Liberals also. With
respect to their attitude towards other nations and cultures, the
Liberals do not seem to be overly concerned with the issue of
“Islamic cultural authenticity”, nor do they seem to worry about
cultural imperialism. Whether out of trust that Islamic culture will
survive, or out of indifference to the eventual outcome, liberals
have few if any reservations about opening the doors fully for
cultural interaction between Islam and the West. But the moderate
Centrists want to proceed with caution here, and they seem bent
on protecting Islamic cultural specificity. Qardawi pleads for the
West to “recognize our right to exist, and the right of Muslims to
live their religion”. His aim is for the West to see that “life can
stem from more than one culture, one civilization. This variety is
in the interest of humanity, not against it”.76
V. Lessons and Explanations
It is apparent that Islamic thought has developed towards a more
realistic perception of itself and the world in which it seeks to
realize its ideals. In the light of the preceding discussion it is also
76
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possible to see that the development towards realism has been
uneven. In the area of international relations, the progress is clear.
Islamic thought here has moved from a starting position of
exclusivity and non-recognition, to the place where it is able to
accept the idea of treating the “Other” on the basis of equality
and reciprocity. However, in the area of domestic politics, that is
the internal politics of the Muslim umma, the change has been
considerable, but less radical.
The basic changes in the area of domestic (national) politics can
be summed up in these two points. Firstly, there has been reduction
of the scale of the political project. In the past, when the idea of
the universal community was alive and effective, it was hoped
that all Muslims (and eventually all humanity) could come to
together to live as one believing community, with one religion,
and one way of life. Nowadays hardly anybody believes in the
possibility of a religious community which is coextensive with
the whole human race. Instead, Islamic movements seek to realize
their political projects in separate, independent and sovereign
nation-states. Even the pan-Islamist idea has limited appeal, and
is conceived of mainly as a foreign policy goal of having special
cooperative relations between sister Muslim states.
The second point where change has taken place has to do the
over-all moderation of the domestic political program. The need
for reform and for flexibility in the application of the Shari’a,
and the need to open and up and co-operate with the outside world,
are recognized by a majority of contemporary Islamic thinkers.
This new and moderate outlook has implications for important
segments of society, including women, non-Muslims and the
secular-minded.
Nevertheless, it is possible to say that no revolutionary
transformation has taken place in this sphere. There has been little
or no willingness to accede to the modern idea of “privatizing”
religion, the idea of making a clean separation between religion
and politics. Aside from increasing the latitude of tolerance, and
some tentative moves towards the justification (in Islamic terms)
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of modern ideas about the institutions of government (elections,
constitutions, branches of government, etc.), the old, classical
notion of the organically conceived Islamic umma still persists,
even it is reduced to nation-state size. The new Islamic ummas
are conceived of as organic unities; difference of belief (beyond
fairly narrow limits) is not welcomed as healthy and natural
pluralism, but as a precursor to strife and division.
In sum, there is a lack of parallelism that can stated thus: whereas
modern Islamic political thought recognizes the “external Other”
and is willing to deal with “him” on the basis of equality and
reciprocity, there has been comparatively little progress towards
recognizing the “internal Other” who lives inside what use to be
referred to as “Dar al-Islam”. Modern Islamic political thought
strives to take control of the nation-state, ignoring its basic logic
which says that religion is (may be) one of many elements in the
definition of political identity, that other factors, such as language,
ethnicity, and international recognition are equally important.
Domestic non-Muslims, secularists, and others, find Islamic
professions of toleration and accommodation somewhat
condescending and ultimately unsatisfactory, while Islamists, for
their own part, do not understand why their professions and
assurances are not gratefully received. There is thus a gulf between
the unqualified acceptance of the “external Other” and the
grudging, and uncertain acceptance of the “internal Other”.
Classical Islamic political thought, it could be said, had the virtue
of self-consistency, whereas Modern Islamic political thought
seems to be in a state of conflict with itself. In Classical Islamic
thought the “Other” (external or internal) had to play by Islamic
rules, or he was be fought. Modern Islamic thought has let go of
the “external Other”, but the one who remains inside still faces
this choice between accepting the basic institutions and
constitution of the Islamic state, or being shut out of political life.
Is there an explanation for the lack of parallelism? As far as the
development of Islamic conceptions of international relations is
concerned, one rather obvious historical fact stands out. Islamic
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foreign relations (like all other foreign relations of that time) were
struggles for domination (regardless of the motivation, be it
spiritual or economic). As long as Muslims were achieving
victories and expanding their control over other peoples and
territories, there was no call for recognition of equality or
reciprocity. However, during the last few hundred years, this
pattern of expansion and domination stopped; in fact, it has been
reversed, so that Muslim were put in the position of self-defense,
suffering from the same lack of recognition which they meted out
to the “external Other” during the previous centuries.
Dar al-Islam has been faced with a great challenge from Dar al-
Harb. Recognition of parity came only after a period of challenges
and defeats, which showed Muslims the limits of their power. As
Khadduri puts it, “Dar al-Islam” has at last reconciled itself to a
peaceful existence with “Dar al-Harb”.77
If this is a reasonable explanation (or part of a more complex
explanation) of the change that took place in Muslim conception
of international relations, then one is next invited to ask if “Dar
al-Islam” itself witnessed struggles and settlements of the kind
that gives rise to mutual recognition and subsequent peaceful co-
existence between contending parties.
This is something which is worth exploring in some detail—how
internal battles were fought, the character of the different parties
which he participated in them, and the type or results they
eventually led to. This is a large undertaking for which we have
no space here. But we can point to some general features of the
internal relations within Dar al-Islam, which seem to suggest that
the pattern of challenge-followed-by-mutual-recognition did not
take place in any meaningful way.
Consider first the challenge that the native religions and cultures
could have posed to the conquering Muslims in the early stages
77
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of Muslim expansion, at a time when these religions and cultures
had the advantage in terms of history and the number of followers.
Apparently, this did not happen. A slow process of Arabization
and Islamization began in the conquered territories, and it
proceeded peacefully for the most part. Those who did not become
Muslim were content live under Muslim rule, subject to certain
limitations, but enjoying certain advantages.
It is true that many customs and ideas were taken over from the
Persians, the ancient Greeks, and Byzantines, but these were woven
into the fabric of an Islamic culture which recognized the dominance
and uniqueness of the Islamic voice. An instance of this can be seen
in the case of the so-called Shu’ubiyya movement which involved
“struggle over the orientation of Islamic civilization” during the
Abbasid period. Followers of this movement chose to express their
distinctive ethnic position by upholding the principle of equating
nobility with piety, rather than Arab origin, as the conquering Arabs
were prone to do. In this the Shu’ubites were following the precept
contained in the well-known Qur’anic verse, which says “The most
noble among in the sight of God is the most pious”.78 (Q 49:13).
This has become typical. Throughout Islamic history, social and
political movements of a non-Islamic origin or character were almost
always constrained to explain themselves in Islamic terms, to make
peace with Islam, as it were, before they could be allowed to develop
and spread their message. This applies to modern and cotemporary
Arab and Muslim thinkers who developed a fondness for democracy,
nationalism, socialism, and women’s rights, which they learned
about from the modern West. In this respect these modern thinkers
have been true heirs to the classical Muslim philosophers who sought
to reconcile Greek philosophy to Islamic learning. The difficulties
which the moderns are facing now are reminiscent of the difficulties
which the classical philosophers faced.
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By comparison, the position which religion has come to occupy
in the Modern West is very different. Christianity had to do battle
with many forces and ideologies, some internal to the West (the
Reformation), some external (Islam), some from the distant past
of the West (the Classical Legacy of the Greek and Roman worlds),
some of more recent origin (science). These challenges, powerful
and continuous, have had a humbling effect on Christian political
thought, which has been forced to see itself as one among many
possible points of view. Christian political thought continues to
make it contribution to on-going political and social debates, but,
having lost the battle with secularism, it is not in a position to
expect (or require) other points of view to pass a test of faith.
In the context of contemporary Western political thought, John
Rawls is able to raise a question which, form an Islamic point of
view, is not easy to understand:
“How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable
and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly
divided by reasonable though incompatible religious,
philosophical, and moral doctrines?”79
His answer, known as the theory of “political liberalism”, is a
conception society along liberal-democratic lines, which all
“reasonable” religious doctrines are expected to endorse ≠ “each
from its point of view”.80
This parity of perspectives (the equality among the different
reasonable “points of view”) which Rawls’s theory presupposes
is not a viable idea, as far as mainstream Islamic political thought
is concerned. The reason is simple: the religious perspective which
informs society and culture has not been seriously challenged, or
say, the challenges which it has had to face were not such as to
79
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convince people at large than religion is one among many possible
ways of viewing reality.
Why has not the challenge arisen? The question which we have
been seeking to answer here is why Islamic political thought
recognizes “parity among the different” in the area of international
relations, whereas it does not seem willing to recognize parity in
the domestic domain. We are now reminded that our suggested
answer ≠ in terms of the presence of serious challenge in one
case, the absence of this in the other≠ itself needs an explanation.
The explanation (of the explanation) has a name which is all too
familiar: it is called “modernity”, something which took place in
the West, but which did not take place in Muslim lands. But to
give a name to something is at best to describe it, to say what it is;
it is not to say how it came about, or why it took place here but
not there. These are all difficult and interesting questions which
cannot be dealt with here. It is not obvious whether modernity is
an unrepeatable event, something which is unique to the West, or
whether it something that can take place in many times, and in
many different places. In other words, it is not obvious if
modernization is equivalent to Westernization.
At any rate, one thing can be said with certainty. If Liberal Islamism,
instead of middle of the road “Centrism”, were to become the
dominant intellectual trend, then that would signal a retreat of the
kind which took place in the West when religion lost the battle with
secularism. Such a retreat would probably pave the way to political
liberalism of the kind that Rawls describes. To some writers who
want to see political liberalism succeed in the Middle East, Liberal
Islamism is the party which must be supported, since “at the present
time, secularism is declining in acceptability and is unlikely to serve
as an ideological basis of political liberalism”.81 But Islamic
Liberalism need not be thought to be an alternative to secularism.
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Remembering the assertions of Ali Abdel-Raziq, and his latter-
day incarnation, Justice Sa’id Ashmawi, Liberal Islamism throws
the door wide open for secularism, and thus need not be an
alternative path leading to political liberalism.
If this were to happen, then unity would be restored to Islamic
political thought, in the sense that its prescriptions for domestic
and international relations would be similar. But of course, this
would represent a complete reversal of the position adopted by
the Classical Islamic theorists.
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